Ambele parti au anunta ca nu are rost organizarea unei intalniri la nivel inalt, in conditiile in care partile se afla pe pozitii divergente in ceea ce priveste sistemul antiracheta. Deocamdata nu se stie nici macar la ce nivel va fi reprezentata Federatia Rusa la aceasta reuniune. Secretarul General al NATO, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, a anuntat Joi la Bruxelles ca au invitat Rusia sa participe si la lucrarile extinse despre Afganistan, ce se organizau in cadrul reuniunii de la Chicago.

Ministrul de Externe rus, Serghei Lavrov, a anunta ca nu s-au hotarat asupra nivelului la care Rusia doreste sa fie reprezentata la reuniune pentru ca nu se cunoaste inca frecventa cu care Rusia o sa participe la reuniunile urmatoare. Pana la aceasta data, Rusia si-a exprimat disponibilitatea si chiar a cerut partenerilor din NATO sa invite Rusia la reuniunile de la Bruxelles alaturi de fortele ISAF, dar in zadar pana acum, a afirmat Serghei Lavrov.

Serghei Lavrov a mai subliniat urmatoarele: “cand Rusia a primit invitatia de a participa la reuniunea de la Chicago (unde se discuta despre Afganistan) ne-am intrebat, la Moscova, oare asta inseamna ca Rusia o sa participe in mod regulat si la intalnirile de la Bruxelles ale NATO? Ulterior s-a dovedit ca NU. Invitatia este doar una singulara; adica sa participam la o reuniune unde practic se “sarbatoreste” evolutia pozitiva a Afganistanului”, a mai spus Lavrov.

Pal Osvath

consilier diplomatic

Prima etapa consta in exercitiul unor baze terestre ce vin in sprijinul operatiunilor mentionate iar in a doua etapa ce se desfasoara in unele sectoare maritime vor fi desfasurate nave de razboi si submarine.

Conform unui comunicat al Ministerului Apararii ruse, la acest exercitiu participa din partea Federatiei Ruse cuirasatul Varjag, distrugatorul Amiral Vinogradov, distrugatorul Amiral Tribus si distrugatorul Maresal Saposnyikov. Cel putin curios este faptul ca navele participante sunt considerate “perlele” flotei din Pacific si au fost fabricate in fosta URSS intre anii 1983-1986. Exercitiul este condus de Amiralul Leonid Suhanov loctiitorul bazei militare a Flotei Federatiei Ruse care a precizat faptul ca, pe timpul exercitiului, comunicarea intre cele doua flote se desfasoara in limba rusa.

China se prezinta la acest exercitiu cu saisprezece nave de razboi si doua submarine insotite de o nava spital.

Locul de desfasurare a exercitiului militar comun este un sector maritim invecinat regiunii Shangdong, nu departe de coastele nord-coreene; astfel, “mesajul transmis” dictaturii comuniste este cat se poate de evident. Nu intamplator a fost anuntat exercitiul militar comun la cateva saptamani dupa ce Corea de Nord a lansat pe orbita primul satelit.

Dar ne putem raporta si altfel la acest exercitiu militar: China si Rusia ne arata ca, la nevoie si in scopul atingerii unor obiective comune, pot fi parteneri, iar parteneriatul lor inseamna o forta militara de temut. Un alt scop ar fi, asa cum am mai amintit, transmiterea unui semnal catre Japonia, tara care are “conflicte teritoriale” cu ambele state participante la exercitiul militar: pe de o parte cu Federatia Rusa referitoare la insulele Kurile care momentan se afla sub jurisdictia Rusiei si disputa in ceea ce priveste insulele Senkaku aflate sub jurisdictie japoneza dar care sunt “dorite” de catre chinezi.

Federatia Rusa si China participa, putem spune, cu regularitate la exercitii militare comune; una din cel mai vaste exercitii la care au participat cele doua tari a avut loc in anul 2005 cand Rusia a participat cu zece nave de razboi si doua submarine iar China cu saizeci de nave de razboi si patru submarine.

Pal Osvath

Consilier diplomatic

“It would take to[o] many words to describe just how frightening this experience was. Immediately after the blast, we were ordered to advance to ground zero. However we were stopped after advancing 500 yards because a sudden wind shift rained down heavy amounts of Gamma radiation upon the Regiment.” – Frank Bushey, U.S. Serviceman who participated in the badger shot.

During the Badger shot, around 2,800 troops took part in an exercise close to ground zero, including an airlift involving 39 helicopters. A U.S. government fact sheet (PDF) notes: “…the number of overexposures at UPSHOT-KNOTHOLE was unusually large. This resulted in part from the heavy fallout and the unanticipated directions in which it was deposited on the ground.” According to calculations by the U.S. National Cancer Institute (PDF), fallout from two tests that were part of the Upshot-Knothole series, Simon and Harry, had the highest caesium-137 levels of any of the continental U.S. tests.

The health hazards from nuclear testing have been evaluated by a number of studies and those affected have sought recognition and financial compensation in many lawsuits. The 1990 Radiation Exposure Compensation Act required the U.S. government to compensate individuals who suffered health consequences from exposure to radiation released by the nuclear testing programme. In 2011, the U.S. Senate adopted a resolution designating 27 January as the National Day of Remembrance for ‘downwinders’ affected by nuclear weapon tests.

The United States conducted its last nuclear test ‘Divider’ on 23 September 1992. In 1996, it was the first country to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which bans all nuclear explosions. However, the United States has yet to ratify the Treaty, a step that is mandatory for its entry into force. The same applies to seven other ‘nuclear-capable’ States: China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran and Pakistan.

Sursa

The radionuclide technology is complementary to the three waveform verification technologies – seismic, infrasound and hydroacoustic – employed by the CTBTO verification regime. This technology is the only one that is able to confirm whether an explosion detected and located by the others is indicative of a nuclear test.

Describing radionuclides

The sun consists in part of the noble gas helium.

The radionuclide monitoring technology measures the abundance of radioactive particles and noble gases, i.e. radionuclides, in the air. A radionuclide is an isotope with an unstable nucleus that loses its excess energy by emitting radiation in the form of particles or electromagnetic waves. This process is called radioactive decay. Radionuclides may occur naturally, but they can also be artificially produced. Radionuclides are often called radioisotopes.

The radionuclide technology is the only one that can confirm whether an explosion is indicative of a nuclear test.

Primordial radionuclides originate mainly from the interiors of stars. Some of them, such as uranium and thorium, decay very slowly and are therefore still present in our universe today. There are also artificially produced radionuclides, which are generated by nuclear reactors, particle accelerators, radionuclide generators or nuclear explosions.

Noble Gases

Noble gases are chemical elements that normally occur in their gaseous state. The name “noble gases” emphasizes the fact that these elements are inert and rarely react with other chemicals. In comparison to radionuclide particles, noble gas atoms are very small.

As other elements, noble gases also occur in nature in a number of isotopes, some of which are unstable and emit radiation. There are some radioactive noble gas isotopes, i.e. radionuclides, which do not occur naturally but can only be produced by nuclear reactions. Due to their nuclear properties, four isotopes of the noble gas xenon are particularly relevant to the detection of nuclear explosions.

Following an atmospheric nuclear explosion, solid fission products attach to dust particles that are propagated by prevailing winds over great distances.

Detecting nuclear explosions

Most of the energy of a nuclear explosion is transformed into the immediate blast, shockwaves and heat – explosive energy that is released within less than a minute. Initial radiation accounts for another small fraction of the energy released during a nuclear explosion. The remaining 10% of the energy is released as residual radiation, which is emitted over time, mainly through radioactive decay of the explosion’s fission products.

Fission products, in solid and gaseous form, are isotopes generated during the nuclear chain reaction. Some of these isotopes are stable. Most are not and undergo radioactive decay, i.e. they are radioactive. Following an atmospheric nuclear explosion, solid fission products attach to dust particles that are propagated by prevailing winds over great distances.

Underwater nuclear explosion also release radioactive particles into the atmosphere. Even shallow underground nuclear explosions can be detected by their release of radioactive debris.

Well-contained underground or deep underwater nuclear explosions, however, do not release any radioactive particles into the air. Another method is needed to detect them.

Radioactive noble gas isotopes – in particular xenon isotopes – are among the fission products generated in a nuclear explosion. Due to their property of being inert, these xenon isotopes will not attach to debris or dust to form larger particles. They remain in their gaseous state and some of them will seep through layers of rock and sediment until they escape into the air. Exposed to prevailing winds, they are dispersed in the atmosphere and may, after a certain period of time, be detected thousands of kilometres away from the explosion site.

Radioactive xenon from a well-contained underground nuclear explosion seeps through layers of rock, escapes into the atmosphere and can later be detected thousands of kilometres away.

The objective of the CTBTO’s radionuclide monitoring network is to detect this residual radiation in the form of radioactive particles or noble gas, even if only in miniscule amounts. By literally collecting and analysing the debris of a nuclear explosion, the radionuclide technology is the only one of the four technologies employed that can provide evidence that an explosion has been nuclear in nature.

Thus, this technology provides the means to identify the “smoking gun” needed to prove a possible violation of the Treaty. With its “forensic proof” of nuclear explosions, the radionuclide technology is of crucial importance to the entire verification effort.

The radionuclide technology provides the means to identify the “smoking gun” needed to prove a possible violation of the Treaty.

However, this does not mean that the CTBTO itself determines whether an explosion has been nuclear in nature or not. It is the prerogative of Member States to make an assessment on the nature of a conspicuous event, based on monitoring data and analysis provided by the CTBTO.

Building radionuclide stations

Stations must have a denser presence near the equator than in higher latitudes because global wind fields in the equatorial region are virtually vertical, while in the North and South they are more lateral. This means that, in the higher latitudes, radionuclides are transported horizontally most effectively. The more stations there are, the greater the probability of detection and the shorter the probable time period of doing so.

Basic components of a radionuclide station include housing for detection equipment (i.e. gamma ray detector, compressed filter, decay chamber) a high volume air sampler and a satellite antenna.

In terms of air sampling at the station site, it is advantageous to have a good mixing of surface air with upper layers of air. In principle, the site should be a windy, exposed place where the passing air really hits the sampler used to collect particulates transported by the wind. The larger the air volume, the greater is the efficiency for particulate sampling.

One disadvantage with this type of detection is that it is passive, relying on air currents to move the particles or gases to the radionuclide detection site. This is why so many stations are needed for the monitoring of radionuclides.

The sequential four-step process used for the establishment of other types of IMS stations is used here as well. It involves site survey, installation, certification and operation.

Ideal radionuclide monitoring sites are windy, exposed places where the passing air really hits the air sampler used to collect particulates transported by the wind.

First, a site survey is conducted to assess the suitability of the site to host a station and identify any specific conditions that would impact on station design. The Treaty lists the geographical coordinates for each station, but only a site survey determines the exact location of a radionuclide station and its elements.

For the manufacture and installation of the station, a single contractor is generally selected through an international tendering process. This contractor is responsible for the station design, manufacture, installation and testing.

The CTBTO reviews all aspects of each station to ensure that it meets all criteria to receive certification as a valid station within the IMS network. Once certified, operation and maintenance agreements are established between the CTBTO and a Station Operator. Long-term quality monitoring is then undertaken to ensure high standards of data quality, data availability; and station performance.

The radionuclide network

The 80-station radionuclide monitoring network enables a continuous worldwide observation of aerosol samples of radionuclides. The network is supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories hosting expertise in environmental monitoring and providing independent additional analysis of IMS samples.

The IMS’s 80-station radionuclide network is supported by 16 radionuclide laboratories hosting expertise in environmental monitoring and providing independent additional analysis of IMS samples.

A radionuclide particulate monitoring station contains an air sampler, detection equipment, computers and a communication set-up. At the air sampler, air is forced through a filter, which retains more than 85% of all particles that reach it. Filters are replaced daily. The used filter is first cooled for a period of 24 hours and then measured for another 24 hours in the detection device at the monitoring station. The result is a gamma ray spectrum that is sent to the International Data Centre for further analysis.

Data sent by the radionuclide stations to the IDC do not only include gamma radiation spectra, but also meteorological and state-of-health information. State-of-health data provide information on the station’s operational status and the quality of the raw monitoring data it transmits.

Support is provided by 16 radionuclide laboratories, which conduct sample analyses if and when necessary. The laboratories analyse samples suspected of containing radionuclide materials that may have been produced by a nuclear explosion. They also conduct routine analyses of regular samples to provide quality control of a station’s air sample measurements.

Radionuclide stations send monitoring data to the IDC, but also information on the station’s operational status and the quality of the transmitted monitoring data.

INGE (International Noble Gas Experiment) 

On an experimental basis, half of all radionuclide stations (i.e. 40) are equipped with the noble gas monitoring technology. Complementary to radionuclide particulate monitoring, the International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) was established in 1999 to test the measuring of radionuclide noble gases released by nuclear explosions.

The International Noble Gas Experiment (INGE) was established in 1999 to test the measuring of radionuclide noble gases released by nuclear explosions.

28 of the 40 planned INGE stations were in operation in 17 countries as of March 2011, with three of them being already certified.

Four measurement systems were included in the experiment: Russia’s ARIX (Analyzer of Xenon Radioisotopes); the United States’ ARSA (Automated Radioxenon Sampler-Analyzer); Sweden’s SAUNA (Swedish Unattended Noble gas Analyzer); and France’s SPALAX (Systéme de Prélèvements et d’Analyse en Ligne. d’Air pour quantifier le Xénon), of which three are currently in use.

As a result of the experiment, the first radionuclide station with noble gas detection capabilities was formally integrated into the global verification regime on 19 August 2010. The noble gas measurement set-up is co-located with radionuclide station RN75 in Charlottesville, Virginia, United States.

All systems in the INGE project work in a similar way. Air is pumped into a charcoal-containing purification device where the noble gas xenon is isolated. Contaminants of different kinds, such as dust, water vapour and other chemical elements, are eliminated. The resulting air contains higher concentrations of xenon, both in its stable and unstable (i.e. radioactive) form. The radioactivity of the isolated and concentrated xenon is measured and the resulting spectrum is sent to the IDC in Vienna for further analysis.

Setting up the radionuclide labs

The 80 radionuclide stations are divided into four regions – the Americas, Europe and Eurasia, Asia and Oceania, and the Mediterranean and Africa – with each region supported by four radionuclide laboratories.

The IMS’s 80 radionuclide stations are divided into four regions – the Americas, Europe and Eurasia, Asia and Oceania, and the Mediterranean and Africa. Each region is supported by four radionuclide laboratories.

These 16 radionuclide labs, and their placements around the world, have been selected to support the station network. Their main function is the independent analysis of particulate samples to corroborate data from other types of stations and to provide quality control through routine sample analyses. Quality control for routine samples foresees one quarterly sample from each station so that the total number is about 320 per year.

Sursa

Referring to the eight countries that have yet to ratify the CTBT for it to become global law – China, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Egypt, India, Israel, Iran, Pakistan and the United States – Ban Ki-moon said: “There is no good reason to avoid signing or ratifying this Treaty. Any country opposed to signing or ratifying it is simply failing to meet its responsibilities as a member of the international community. It is irresponsible to see this Treaty still waiting to come into effect 15 years after it was opened for signature. I stand ready to visit those capitals suspicious about the reliability of the Treaty’s monitoring and inspection systems.”

The UN Secretary-General, the Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Waldner, Mexican Ambassador Juan José Gómez Camacho and CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth, addressed the festivities marking the 15th anniversary of the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO) at the Vienna International Centre in Vienna, Austria. The event was musically framed by a large choir from the American International School of Vienna and attended by the diplomatic community, NGOs, international media and staff of other Vienna-based organizations – over 500 participants in total. The event also marked the opening of the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs’ Vienna-base.

The UN Secretary-General also paid tribute to the victims of the over 2000 nuclear tests conducted worldwide: “Nuclear tests poison the environment – and they also poison the political climate. They breed mistrust, isolation and fear. So today I issue a challenge to all leaders of all countries that have not endorsed the CTBT: Visit the site of a nuclear test. Speak to the population exposed to the fallout. Then take action to prevent this from ever happening again.”

According to Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt, co-chair of the so-called Article XIV-process to advance the CTBT’s entry into force, the Treaty “has succeeded in creating a strong norm against nuclear testing, and a major barrier for nuclear weapons development. All 182 States Signatories have refrained from nuclear explosive testing. The international community has been firm and unanimous in its response to the three countries [India, Pakistan and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea] that have remained outside and tested.”

Mexican Ambassador Juan José Gómez Camacho, delivering a statement (video) by Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa Cantellano, the other co-chair of the Article-XIV process, said: “Even if the CTBT has yet to enter into force, it is paramount that we all understand that its regime already constitutes a legal corpus to be observed by the international community.”

Representing the host country, Austrian State Secretary for Foreign Affairs Wolfgang Waldner said (video) “We are proud that this important organization is headquartered in Vienna and that we can celebrate the Secretariat’s 15th anniversary. Austria will continue to work tirelessly with our partners to convince the remaining states whose ratification is required until the CTBT is finally brought into legal effect.”

CTBTO Executive Secretary Tibor Tóth echoed this sentiment: “At age 15, we are proud of our achievements. The family of CTBT Member States has grown to 182, 157 of which have ratified. The network has grown, station by station. 285 facilities, more than 80% of the International Monitoring System, are up and running. An around the globe and around the clock system. A system of 1 billion dollars and 10,000 scientist years of investments.”

Background

The CTBT bans all nuclear explosions by everyone, everywhere: on the Earth’s surface, in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater and underground. 182 countries have signed the Treaty, of which 157 have also ratified it. An unprecedented global verification regime with over 300 sensors monitors the globe around the clock for nuclear explosions to detect any violations of the Treaty.

Sursa

In urma imploziei Uniunii Sovietice, America ramasese singura supraputere globala. Liderii de la Washington, ca si multi comentatori reputabili, pretindeau ca prabusirea comunismului a demonstrat definitiv superioritatea democratiei liberale ca organizare a societatii, ca extinderea democratiei sub obladuirea hegemonului american va crea conditii extrem de favorabile pentru crearea prosperitatii si ca progresul in domeniul tehnicii militare, in combinatie cu puterea economica proprie, vor asigura permanent suprematia militara a Statelor Unite.

Atacurile teroriste din septembrie 2001 au socat societatea americana si au oferit un prilej pentru Bush sa declare un „razboi antiterorist” prin care sa demonstreze categoric capabilitatea SUA de a domina arena internationala, de a-si impune dezideratele in strainatate si de a fi dispuse sa utilizeze forta militara in acest scop. In martie 2003 armata americana, cu participarea secundara a unor aliati „voluntari”, a invadat Irakul cu intentia de a-l elimina pe dictatorul Saddam si de a impune prin forta formarea unui stat arab democrat care, fiind recunoscator pentru eliberare, ar ramane aliat cu SUA si ar deveni un exemplu irezistibil pentru celelalte state arabe.

Victoria initiala a invaziei a fost fulgeratoare. Bagdadul a cazut in mai putin de trei saptamani. In aprilie, Bush a declarat triumfal ca „misiunea a fost indeplinita”. Neinspirati, ocupantii au demolat structurile guvernamentale, au demis armata si au desfiintat institutiile sociale si educationale din Irak. In urmatorii 8 ani, Irakul a fost devastat de haos, insurgenta colerica impotriva ocupantilor si razboi civil interetnic. In conditii de teama, incertitudine si violenta, irakienii au adoptat loialitatea traditionala fata de etnie, secta relogioasa si trib. Ca sa supravietuiasca, siitii au fugit din zonele ocupate de suniti si viceversa. Kurzii s-au retras intr-un ministat semiautonom in nordul tarii. 140.000 de militari americani nu au reusit sa previna conflictul violent dintre factiunile irakiene sau sa domoleasca insurgenta impotriva ocupantilor. Dupa patru ani de razboi, exasperat de esecul democratizarii Irakului, in ianuarie 2007, Bush a ordonat desfasurarea in Irak a unui contigent aditional de 30.000 de soldati americani. In cele din urma, sleiti de razboi, atrocitati si umilinte, irakienii au participat la alegeri si au acceptat, aparent, formarea unui guvern dominat de siiti majoritari cu participarea unor reprezentanti suniti si kurzi. In 2006, cand violenta era apriga, americanii aveau 239.000 de soldati si 135.000 de mercenari care, impreuna, ocupau mai mult de 500 de baze militare distibuite in toata tara.

Asa cum promisese presedintele Barak Obama in campania electorala din 2008, militarii americani au parasit Irakul. Bazele militare americane, inchisorile si soselele au fost transferate armatei nationale irakiane. Plecarea a fost indeplinita „in secret”, pe motive de securitate. Evacuarea militarilor a fost programata sa coincida cu o perioada de o luna, numita Muharram, in care religia mahomedana nu permite festivitati. Sarbatorirea terminarii ocupatiei in Irak este programata pentru ianuarie 2012.

Statele Unite vor contiuna sa mentina o oarecare prezenta in Irak: 1.700 de diplomati, ocupand cea mai mare ambasada americana din lume la Bagdad, 5.000 de militari mercenari care vor asigura securitatea „ramasilor”, 4.500 de „contractori” cu diferite functii, instructori militari si mai multi experti in diferite domenii.

Conform datelor publicate de ministerul apararii al SUA, 4.500 de soldati americani si-au pierdut viata in Irak. Peste 30.000 au fost raniti. In total, 1,5 milioane de americani au participat la razboiul din Irak. Controversat de la inceput, razboiul a costat America o mie de miliarde USD. O baza de date independenta din Irak a estimat ca cel putin 150.000 de irakieni au fost ucisi intre martie 2003 si octombrie 2010, patru din cinci fiind civili. Milioane de irakieni au fost obligati sa-si paraseasca locuintele. Aprovizionarea cu apa si electricitate sunt inca zilnic intrerupte.

La data de 13 decembrie 2011, la ceremonia discreta pentru incheierea oficiala a prezentei militare americane din Irak, doua scaune cu etichete erau rezervate pentru presedintele irakian Jalal Talabani si primul ministru Nouri Al-Maliki, cu speranta ce ei vor exprima public o oarecare recunostinta pentru sacrificiile americane in Irak. Evitand ocazia, cei doi lideri nu s-au prezentat. Ceea ce reflecta limitele realizarilor razboiului numit „Liberarea Irakului”.

Nimeni nu pretinde ca Irakul a devenit un aliat strategic al Statelor Unite. Premierul al-Maliki este mai apropiat de Teheran decat de Washington. Si, totusi, fiind nationalist, nu este marioneta nimanui. Pana acum, Maliki a semnalat ca nu va sprijini politica americana de izolare a Iranului pentru ambitiile sale nucleare, nu va avea o atitudine amicala fata de statul Israel si nu va fi alaturi de statele care incearca sa-l detroneze pe Bahar al-Assad in Siria. Simtindu-se fortat de parlament, de opinia publica si de presiunile iraniene, Maliki a refuzat sa acorde imunitate judiciara militarilor straini. Ceea ce a fortat retragerea completa a combatantilor militari americani din Irak la finele anului 2011, asa cum se stabilise in trecut in negocierile cu fostul presedinte Bush.

Persecutiile si abuzurile prizonierilor irakieni la Abu Ghraib, masacrele de la Haditha, Fallujah si Balad, ca si inabilitatea fortelor militare americane de a „supune” irakienii au diminuat influenta Statelor Unite in regiune. Celelalte state arabe nu au fost tentate sa adopte modelul irakian de „democratizare” fortata. Revolutiile arabe din 2011 si alungarea unor dictatori huliti care beneficiau de sustinerea Washingtonului au demonstrat ca abilitatea autoritatilor americane de a convinge aliatii si de a intimida adversarii a scazut dupa invazia din Irak.

Parasit de trupele coalitiei, Irakul este fragil, covarsit de suspiciuni si zbuciumat de conflicte politice. Ostilitatile interetnice traditionale din Irak ar putea redeveni violente. Militiile sectariene au ramas puternic inarmate. Divergentele traditionale dintre siiti, suniti si kurzi sunt nerezolvate. Legi care sa acopere distribuirea surselor energetice inca nu au fost adoptate. In loc sa promoveze inclusivitate, Maliki a luat masuri drastice sa concentreze puterea in mainile sale.

Guvernul „inclusiv” de la Bagdad a inceput sa se destrame. In aceeasi zi in care ultimii militari americani paraseau tara, blocul Irakiya, sustinut de suniti, a anuntat ca nu mai participa la deliberarile parlamentare si ca paraseste guvernul de coalitie deoarece nu i se permite sa contribuie la procesul politic si deoarece premierul Maliki, insistand sa controleze personal serviciile de securitate si ministerele de Interne si de Aparare, „este un dictator”.

Autoritatile au emis un mandat de arestare pentru vicepresedintele sunit Tariq al-Hasimi, acuzat de terorism. Trei bodygarzi ai lui Hasimi au depus marturie ca el ar fi ordonat atentate si asasinari vizand oficiali si ofiteri de securitate siiti. Desi Hasimi a insistat ca nu este vinovat, el s-a deplasat urgent in Kurdistan ca sa se consulte cu vicepresedintele siit Khuddayyer al-Khuzaie si presedintele irakinan Jalal Talibani. Presedintele Kurdistanului, Massoud Barzani a declarat ca nu il va preda pe Hasimi autoritatilor de la Bagdad deoarece Hasimi este oaspetele lui. Un alt vicepremier sunit, Saleh al-Mutlah, vizat de Maliki pentru demitere, l-a insotit pe Hasimi in nord. Sute de fosti membrii ai partidului Baathist au fost arestati in ultimele saptamani. Forte de securitate controlate de Maliki au fost plasate in jurul caselor liderilor suniti din capitala.

Rapiditatea cu care liderii factiunilor din Irak au acutizat divergentele dintre ei a creat o activitate diplomatica frantica la Casa Alba, la Departamentul de Stat si la Pentagon. Incercand sa dezamorseze criza, oficialii americani au pus presiuni asupra lui Maliki sa renunte la tedintele autoritare, sa accepte impartirea puterii si sa arate toleranta fata de oponenti. A devenit clar ca, fara prezenta „pacificatoare” a armatei americane, politica din Irak va fi determinata de spaima, incertitudini si tendinte separatiste. Desi a avut alegeri, Irakul „postbelic” este departe de a fi o democratie functionala.

Nicolae Filipescu

De ce este indignată Rusia? Doar antirachetele nu au niciun gram de substanţă explozibilă pentru nimicirea ţintelor? La această întrebare ne răspunde Viktor Litovkin, expert la publicaţia rusească Viziune Militară Independentă.

„SUA spun că ele creează un scut nuclear împotriva regimurilor imprevizibile, precum cel iranian. De fapt, construiesc un zid antirachetă împotriva Rusiei. În ce constă pericolul? În partea europeană a Rusiei sunt amplasate forţele strategice de descurajare nucleară. Fireşte, complexele Aegis şi rachetele SM-3 din România nu prezintă la ora actuală un pericol real pentru noi. Ele sunt concepute pentru a nimici focoasele rachetelor cu rază medie şi mică de acţiune, pe care noi nu le avem în dotare. Însă în anii 2020-2022 vor apărea antirachete în Polonia, pe navele din Marea Norvegiei şi Marea Nordului. Iar acestea deja vor putea intercepta rachetele intercontinentale. Tocmai acest lucru nelinişteşte Rusia. De fapt, SUA reduc posibilitatea Rusiei de a-şi apăra interesele sale strategice, suveranitatea sa!”.

De ce riscuri trebuie să ţină cont ţara, în cazul dat România, care pune la dispoziţie teritoriul său în vederea amplasării elementelor de apărare antirachetă ale NATO? l-am întrebat pe Viktor Litovkin.

„Ea trebuie să ţină cont de faptul că, în cazul unui conflict între SUA şi Rusia (să nu dea Dumnezeu!), pentru asigurarea deplasării rachetelor noastre către ţintă, prima lovitură va fi aplicată asupra sistemelor terestre ale apărării antirachetă. Aceasta este logica militară”.

De ce NATO nu accepta propunerile ruseşti privind crearea unui scut european comun, bazat pe principiul sectorial? Poate că însăşi ideea este irealizabilă?

„Este absolut realizabilă. Trebuie ca ambele sisteme să aibă un singur sistem informaţional. Dacă ipotetica rachetă iraniană va fi lansată în Europa, atunci ea va trece inevitabil prin teritoriul Rusiei, care, fireşte, nu va ignora acest lucru. Viaţa ne împinge la colaborare în faţa unui pericol comun. Însă SUA nu se grăbesc”, consideră expertul rus.

În replică la planurile NATO de a amplasa rachete interceptoare în Spania şi Olanda, complexe mobile în Polonia şi România, radar în Turcia şi „ceva antirachetă” (cum cere Saakaşvili) în Georgia, Rusiei îi este suficient să desfăşoare complexul de rachete Iskander în Kaliningrad. Însă contracararea contravine logicii „resetării” şi este absurdă.

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Vinderea acestui palat investitorilor din Rusia sau China este o variantă de salvare. Ziarul nu enumeră numele posibililor cumpărători.

Oficial, această scutire a fost aprobată de Guvern pe 27 decembrie 2011 însă, de fapt, interdicţia a fost anulată mai devreme. La jumătatea lunii noiembrie 2011, Guvernul japonez a permis companiei naţionale ShinMaywa să ia parte la tenderul indian de livrare a avioanelor amfibie.

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